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# REPORT OF THE REVIEW BODY ON ARMED FORCES PAY 1972

Chairman:  
H. W. ATCHERLEY

*Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister  
by Command of Her Majesty  
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## **REVIEW BODY ON ARMED FORCES PAY**

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<sup>(1)</sup>Also members of the Top Salaries Review Body.

<sup>(2)</sup>Also a member of the Doctors' and Dentists' Review Body.

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

1. We were formally appointed in September 1971 with the terms of reference:

“To advise the Prime Minister on the pay and allowances of members of Naval, Military and Air Forces of the Crown and of any women’s service administered by the Defence Council.”

We were asked to relate our first review to 1 April 1972.

We were informed that further reviews should normally be undertaken at 2-yearly intervals, and that our recommendations would be accepted by the Government unless there were clear and compelling reasons for their not doing so.

2. Our responsibility is thus to advise on the pay and allowances of over 350,000 men in the Armed Forces, and about 15,000 women in the women’s Services; at current rates, these amount in all to £747m. a year, or rather more than one-quarter of the total Defence Budget of £2,854m.

3. Two other Review Bodies were appointed at about the same time. One, the Top Salaries Review Body, is responsible for advising the Prime Minister on the pay of the chairmen and members of the boards of nationalised industries; the higher Judiciary; senior Civil Servants; and senior Officers of the Armed Forces. Senior officers are defined for this purpose as Major Generals and above; our own terms of reference must, therefore, be interpreted as applying to the ranks up to and including Brigadier<sup>(1)</sup>. The third Review Body is the Doctors’ and Dentists’ Review Body, which deals with the remuneration of doctors and dentists in the National Health Service.

4. The advice we give to the Government must be consistent both in relation to the general problems that concern any advisory body dealing with pay and to particular areas where there is a link between the groups dealt with by the three Bodies. For example, our recommendations on the pay of officers in the rank of Brigadier and below and those made by the Top Salaries Review Body for Major Generals and above must clearly be related to each other. Similarly, in recommending rates of pay for medical and dental officers in the Armed Forces we need to have regard to the recommendations made by the Doctors’ and Dentists’ Review Body about the pay of doctors and dentists in the National Health Service. In order to ensure consistency in these matters there is an interlocking membership between the three Review Bodies; two of our members are also members of the Top Salaries Review Body and one is a member of the Doctors’ and Dentists’ Review Body. The three Review Bodies have, in addition, a common secretariat provided by the Office of Manpower Economics (OME).

5. All three Review Bodies are concerned with groups that have no machinery for settling pay by collective bargaining. Certain groups dealt with by the other Review Bodies, however, have representative bodies that can give evidence on their behalf. Others, including the Armed Forces and women’s Services, have none. Our impressions of the attitude of servicemen towards their pay are drawn from discussions with individuals and informal groups, during the visits we have paid to Service units, and from discussions with senior officers and officials in the Ministry of Defence. Most of us have been or are concerned with employment conditions in the Armed Forces or in civil life.

6. Until 1970, servicemen were paid partly in cash and partly by the provision of food and accommodation which were, in principle, free. Married men received an additional cash payment known as a marriage allowance and, when living with their families, a ration allowance (which was free of income tax) in place of Service rations. The rents charged by the Services for public married quarters were significantly lower than the

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<sup>(1)</sup>Here, and elsewhere in this report when the context allows, references to Army ranks are intended to include the equivalent ranks in the other Services.

general level of non-Service rents for similar accommodation, the difference being intended as partial compensation for the frequent moves associated with life in the Services.<sup>(1)</sup>

7. Employment conditions in the Armed Forces were reviewed in 1958 by the Advisory Committee on Recruiting under the Chairmanship of Sir James Grigg<sup>(2)</sup>. Pay had previously been reviewed only at irregular intervals and the Committee recommended a system of regular reviews every two years. Under this system, which became known as the "Grigg formula", changes in officers' pay were determined by reference to changes in the pay of the executive and administrative grades of the home Civil Service, and changes in other ranks' pay by reference to changes in average earnings in manufacturing and other industries. Servicemen thus had an assurance that their pay would be adjusted periodically to take account of changes in earnings in civil life; but in other respects the basic system of pay remained unaltered; the serviceman's remuneration was, as before, partly in cash and partly in kind, and married and single men were paid at different rates. There was no direct relationship between military pay and the amount a serviceman might have expected to earn if he had been doing a job of comparable responsibility in civil life and the real value of total remuneration was difficult to ascertain.

8. In November 1965 the Government asked the National Board for Prices and Incomes (NBPI) to advise them whether the increases in pay that were due in April 1966 under the Grigg formula were consistent with the criteria laid down in the then current White Paper on Prices and Incomes Policy.<sup>(3)</sup> In its report of January 1966<sup>(4)</sup> the NBPI said that until the Government notified servicemen of the adoption of a new system of review it was committed to the existing system and the pay increases should be made. At the same time the Board questioned whether the methods of comparing civilian and Service pay used in the Grigg formula could be reconciled with the White Paper criteria.

9. Before the next biennial review was due, in April 1968, the Government made the pay of the Armed Forces the subject of a Standing Reference to the NBPI. In its first report<sup>(5)</sup> under this reference the NBPI recommended a pay increase of 7 per cent as an interim measure and stated that it would undertake a review of the structure of Service pay and of the most appropriate method of determining it for the future.

10. The first stage of this work was the subject of the next report<sup>(6)</sup> in which, in addition to proposals concerning pay and allowances in the immediate future (including an interim pay increase of 3½ per cent), there were long-term proposals for changing the whole structure of Service pay. Specifically, the NBPI recommended the introduction of a comprehensive "military salary" which would be subject to tax in the normal way and out of which servicemen would be required to pay for their food and accommodation in the same way as civilians. Married and single men would be paid the same for similar work and special allowances should be eliminated, as far as reasonable and practicable. It would then be possible to make direct comparisons between Service and civilian pay. Salaries for the different ranks and Service trades should be determined in the light of comparisons of job size (using job evaluation techniques) with earnings for jobs of comparable skill and responsibility in civil life after making due allowance for other conditions of service. Certain features of Service life were, however, considered unique in combination and incapable of measurement by standards drawn from civilian life. The most important of these features were danger; frequent moves from place to place; military discipline, which involved restrictions on personal liberty not normally

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<sup>(1)</sup>There were two scales of marriage allowance in the United Kingdom; the "in-quarters" scale paid to men occupying public married quarters and a higher scale paid to those in private accommodation.

<sup>(2)</sup>The Committee's report was published as Cmnd. 545.

<sup>(3)</sup>Cmnd. 2639.

<sup>(4)</sup>NBPI Report No. 10, Cmnd. 2881.

<sup>(5)</sup>NBPI Report No. 70, Cmnd. 3651, May 1968.

<sup>(6)</sup>NBPI Report No. 116, Cmnd. 4079, June 1969.

endured in civil life; and the inability freely to change jobs. These needed to be set against the advantages which the serviceman had over most civilians, notably a greater breadth of training and the chance to carry responsibility when young, coupled with a greater economic security than was enjoyed by most civilians. The balance of advantage and disadvantage was judged to be a factor—referred to as the X factor—adverse to military life requiring an addition to the basic salary as determined by reference to job size alone.

11. In a further report,<sup>(1)</sup> after job evaluation studies which incorporated comparisons with civilian earnings, the NBPI recommended the levels of salaries to be paid, and the charges to be made for food and accommodation. It also made recommendations about a range of items including additional pay and allowances. The recommendations were accepted by the Government and put into effect from 1 April 1970, except that the pay increase for single men (needed to bring their total pay into line with that of married men) was staged; part being implemented from 1 April 1970 and the remainder from 1 April 1971.

12. The 1970 rates of pay were thus the first to be based on direct comparisons between military and civilian jobs. The NBPI proposed that the level of pay should be reviewed every two years, with a more thorough reconsideration of the internal pay structure and its relationships with civilian employment at regular intervals of perhaps six years. However, because of the rapid rise in prices and civilian earnings in 1970 and 1971, the Government, in August 1971, increased the rates of pay by 7 per cent as an interim step, pending the preparation of our first report. The charges for food and accommodation were increased at the same time and in roughly the same proportions.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE PRESENT PAY STRUCTURE

13. One of the basic needs of the military salary system is to relate pay to the degree of skill and responsibility attached to a serviceman's job—the "size" of the job. Job size can be assessed by different systems of job evaluation which, broadly speaking, enable jobs to be ranked in order of size by attaching appropriate weightings to the training and experience required, the physical and mental demands the job imposes, and the degree of responsibility it entails. The methods used in the Armed Forces are described in the NBPI reports of June 1969 (Appendices 6 and 7) and February 1970 (Appendix 6).

14. It was found that the sizes of most officers' jobs were fairly closely related to the rank of the officer, regardless of the Service in which he was employed. Some of the minor differences in the rates of pay in the three Services, which had previously existed, were therefore abolished. Single rates of pay are fixed for Second Lieutenants and for Brigadiers; in the remaining ranks, from Lieutenant to Colonel, there are incremental pay scales, the increments being related to service in the rank or to total commissioned service. Some categories of officers, e.g. doctors and dentists, lawyers and veterinary surgeons, have special rates of pay; and there is additional pay for certain duties (flying, service in submarines and parachute units, etc). There are also special pay rates for former NCO's who enter commissioned service in relatively junior ranks when they are older than officers commissioned direct from civil life.

15. The job sizes of other ranks were found to be less closely related to rank<sup>(1)</sup>. The Armed Forces need men to do a wide variety of jobs, many requiring high mental and physical skills and the acceptance of considerable responsibility without necessarily involving the command over other men that requires high rank. Unlike officers, for whom the bigger jobs are, in general, accompanied by higher rank, other ranks may be rewarded for bigger jobs by higher rates of pay only. On the other hand, rank may be awarded for reasons other than job size or the command function. It may, for example, be directly related to length of service; or to the need to provide a career structure. For these reasons there are considerable variations in job size within the same rank. (This was recognised in the Armed Forces pay systems even before any formal job evaluation had been used; in the Army and RAF the Service trades which required higher skills were paid at higher rates, rank for rank, at all ranks from private to Warrant Officer. In the Navy at the rank of Petty Officer and above there were, in parallel with the Army and RAF, higher rates for the more highly skilled trades but there was no differentiation in pay at lower ranks up to Leading Rate.)

16. It would not be practicable to have a large number of different rates of pay to reflect minor differences in job size, and the system adopted in 1970 groups the Service trades in the Army and RAF into three bands. Band 3, which contains the most highly skilled trades, carries a higher rate of pay than Band 2, which contains less highly skilled trades; and Band 2 carries a higher rate of pay than Band 1. In the Army and RAF the pay of any serviceman from private to Warrant Officer thus depends partly on his rank and partly on the pay band to which his Service trade is allocated. In the Navy a single band was adopted up to Leading Rate. (Recruits are paid on scales equivalent to Band 1 as in the other Services, and Able and Leading ratings on scales equivalent to Band 2.) At Petty Officer and above most trades remain in Band 2 but some of the more highly skilled trades are paid on higher scales, broadly equivalent to Band 3.

17. The division of pay rates into three bands, broadly dependent on the skills and responsibilities of the trades, is complicated by the payment of "committal pay" to those who engage to serve for more than the minimum period. Thus, for those com-

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<sup>(1)</sup>The 1970 study was made principally at Corporal level; but extended studies of senior NCOs and Warrant Officers described in Chapter 8 and Appendix 2 confirm that a wide spread of job sizes exists within each rank, with a considerable degree of overlap between ranks.

mitted to serve for less than six years there is a basic scale of pay in the three bands, known as scale A. For those committed to serve for six but less than nine years there is a scale known as scale B which is at present £1.47 a week above scale A; whilst for those committed to serve for nine or more years there is scale C—at present £3.78 above scale A. There are thus, in principle, nine rates of pay at each rank. As, however, many ranks embody a number of classes, e.g. Private Class I, II, III and IV, there can be still more rates of pay for one rank, dependent on class, scale and band. Henceforth in this report, where a scale is required for illustrative purposes in our recommendations, we use scale B, i.e. the scale for those committed to serve for six but less than nine years.

18. In addition to pay by rank, class, scale and band other ranks receive length of service increments of pay, varying by rank and length of service, after a minimum of nine years' service. They may also (like officers) receive additional pay for special duties such as flying or service in submarines or parachute units.

19. Finally, both officers and other ranks are eligible for various allowances in particular circumstances (e.g. Local Overseas Allowance, Education Allowance) or more generally (e.g. leave travel warrants). It is not possible to make an absolutely clear distinction between items termed additional pay and those described as allowances. Local Overseas Allowance, for example, is a payment designed to increase a serviceman's pay in an overseas station to maintain an equivalent purchasing power to that enjoyed in the UK and is therefore of the nature of pay. Other allowances are of the same type. As a broad generalisation, however, additional pay is related to the nature of a man's work or his committal to it, whilst allowances are related to his circumstances.

20. Payments which are described above as allowances amount to some £81m. out of the total of £747m. to which we referred in paragraph 2, whilst additional pay accounts for about £10m.

## OUR APPROACH TO OUR TASK

21. As a review body charged with the duty of recommending pay for large numbers of men and women who have no negotiating machinery we must seek to ensure that pay is and remains fair in relation to pay in other walks of life. This is not only a matter of equity. In this country, unlike most others, the Armed Forces are made up entirely of volunteers. Although there is no evidence of any direct relationship between pay and the levels of recruitment and retention, we believe that unless servicemen and potential recruits have a continuing assurance that their pay will be kept roughly in line with the level of pay in civil life it will be impossible to recruit and retain all the men and women the Services need to carry out the obligations placed upon them in the national interest. In this connection, the White Paper "Statement on the Defence Estimates 1972"<sup>(1)</sup> indicates a striking improvement in recruiting during the past year and an increase in the numbers of servicemen prolonging their service. There seems little doubt, however, that continuing adverse demographic factors, the imminent raising of the school leaving age, and the relaxation of terms of engagement will place increasing emphasis on retention, i.e. the need for prolongation of service by committal and by re-engagement. In recommending rates of pay we also need to bear in mind the fact that the pay of the Services is a large item in the total public expenditure; and, in present circumstances, the importance which the Government attaches to bringing about a reduction in the rate of increase in money incomes in the economy as a whole.

22. The determination of fair rates of pay requires reliable methods of comparison. The NBPI's introduction, in 1970, of job evaluation in order "to give an indication of the levels of pay in civilian employment for jobs which are comparable in terms of skill and responsibility with jobs in the Services" was an important innovation. We agree with the principles of these comparisons, and intend to continue using them, complementing them where necessary by information from salary surveys and index figures for the movement of earnings and prices.

23. The use of job evaluation and other information cannot, however, provide an exact indication of the proper level of Service pay; the process of determining fair levels cannot be reduced to a formula. In civil life there are very wide variations, both in the level of pay for apparently similar jobs and in the differentials between jobs. Information on civil pay is therefore a guide to judgement, not a substitute for it. Even if the equivalent civilian "rate for the job" could be determined more exactly than is actually the case it would not be right to import all the features of civilian pay structures into the Services. Service pay must be determined in the context of a rank structure that is different from the rank structures generally found in civil life; and because of the special recruitment needs of the Services, and the high cost of military training, Service pay must embody incentives for men to commit themselves to extended periods of service, and to prolong their commitment when they have the opportunity, in a way that is not appropriate to civilian employment.

24. Service pay must take account also of the nature of a Service career. Whilst it is important that men should be encouraged to serve beyond the minimum period, the emphasis must nevertheless be on youth. Most servicemen, therefore, must leave the Services (whether or not they wish to do so) at a comparatively early age and find other work. Even for the minority who attain high rank, or who can be retained in the Services for other reasons, retirement comes earlier than in civil life, and usually involves the need to start a second career in middle age. Pensions do not come within our terms of reference, but their value ought to be taken into account as part of the total remuneration that servicemen receive and be related to the special features of a Service career. This is a matter we may need to consider in future reviews, though, as pensions are currently under review by the Government, we have been unable to do so on this occasion.

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<sup>(1)</sup>Cmnd. 4891, February, 1972.



25. Finally, Service pay must acknowledge the balance of advantages and disadvantages in the features of Service life that are summed up in the X factor. This element in pay is not related to movements in civilian earnings, or indeed to any civilian standards of measurement, and may therefore need to be reviewed independently of the consideration of other factors affecting pay.

26. The recommendations in the present report are based on a relatively short study of pay and conditions in the Services; further, the Services themselves have had little time as yet to adjust themselves to the structural changes in pay that were introduced in 1970. In these circumstances, it would not be right to propose any far reaching changes. Our main recommendations, therefore, are designed to do no more than make adjustments to rates of pay and differentials in the light of the changes that have occurred in civilian earnings during the last two years. We have also made recommendations on food and accommodation charges; these are of an interim nature, pending further consideration.

27. Although there was a considerable measure of simplification in 1970, the structure of Service pay and allowances is still complex. A complex structure can lead not only to excessive administrative cost but, more important, to dissatisfaction among servicemen themselves. The payment of many items of additional pay and allowances is governed by intricate rules, and it is doubtful whether all these can be justified, and indeed whether some of these items serve the purposes for which they were originally intended. We have made recommendations to bring up to date the rates of payment in some instances, where we think that action ought not to be postponed, but we intend to undertake additional studies during the next twelve months or so with the aim of making a further report early in 1973.

28. In Chapters 4-7, we consider, and make recommendations on, military salaries; the pay of the women's Services; additional pay and special pay scales; and charges for food and accommodation; based on the approach we have adopted and described above.

## MILITARY SALARIES

29. We now examine the specific considerations which, together with the more general aims described in the previous chapter, have led to our recommendations.

**Movements in Civilian Pay**

30. Comparisons can be made between civilian and Service pay at a number of different levels. In the first place, comparisons can be drawn between young civilians starting their careers and young men entering the Services either as other ranks or officers. The 1970 rates of pay for Privates Class IV and Second Lieutenants, which included the equivalent of the former marriage allowance, were recognised by the NBPI to compare favourably with the pay obtainable at the start of a career in civil life. The Board said that "given the present favourable position, the pay adjustments we may recommend in future reviews will not necessarily keep step with the adjustments recommended for men with longer service". In August 1971, however, these rates were included in the "across the board" award of a 7 per cent increase. We have carried out a survey in a number of large companies of the starting salaries and early salary progressions of graduate recruits to management and the professions and have, in addition, obtained information on the current pay levels of young employees (under the age of 21) in manual and clerical employment. We are satisfied that the present starting salaries of new entrants to the Armed Forces still compare favourably with those of their counterparts in civilian life, and that if they are to be increased at all on this occasion the increases should be small.

31. The next level where comparisons are particularly relevant is at the rank of Corporal, and it was indeed at this rank that the NBPI carried out the job evaluated comparisons described in its report of February 1970<sup>(1)</sup>. The Ministry of Defence and OME have obtained up-to-date information about the pay for the civilian jobs evaluated in the NBPI sample. The inquiry was intended to cover the whole of the sample of 728 jobs used in 1969, but in the event usable replies were obtained for only 410. We gratefully acknowledge the goodwill and co-operation of over two hundred firms and public authorities who provided the data and facilities for re-examination of the jobs, without which this part of the study could not have been carried out. The information obtained from this smaller sample suggests that the average earnings in jobs which formerly corresponded to those of Corporal in the three Service pay bands increased by 25 to 28 per cent between November 1969 and November 1971. However, re-evaluation of a random sample of the jobs (covering about one-fifth of the total) suggested that there had been an increase in job size. One quarter of the job sizes, as measured by the job evaluation system employed, had risen by between 1 and 45 per cent, the average increase being between 9 and 10 per cent. None of the jobs in the random sample had decreased in size.

32. It is not possible to state with precision the extent to which the equivalent service rates of pay would be reduced by this increase in civilian job sizes but it is probably right to say that the average earnings of the true civilian comparators to the Corporal have increased by about 22 to 25 per cent over their 1969 levels. The increase in the average earnings of male manual workers in general in roughly the same period, as published by the Department of Employment, falls within this range.

33. Finally, comparisons can be made between civilian earnings and those of officers in the ranks from Captain to Brigadier. With the aid of the management consultants formerly employed for this purpose by the NBPI we have compared the earnings of officers with those attaching to jobs of similar size in more than 100 organisations using the same system of evaluation. After taking the latest available figures and adjusting them to take account of differences in pension arrangements, and of the bonuses and company cars that frequently form part of civilian remuneration, we found that the levels of pay now appropriate represented a range of increases between 16 and 19 per cent over the military salaries that were introduced in April 1970.

<sup>(1)</sup>NBPI Report No. 142, Cmnd. 4291, February 1970, Appendix 6.

### **Relativities within the Services**

34. We need to take account of two other factors. First, the 1970 pay scales did not make any major change in the relativities between the pay of senior NCO's and Warrant Officers and of junior commissioned officers that had existed in the past. Because these relativities are based on custom and practice and are not necessarily justified by the relative job sizes, a pilot study was undertaken to examine the relationships in job sizes between these ranks. No evidence has been found as yet which would justify any departure from the existing relativities. Thus the levels of pay of senior NCO's and Warrant Officers should not, for the present, be such as to disturb these relativities. We intend to consider whether further studies of this question would be desirable.

35. Second, the studies of senior NCO and Warrant Officer jobs that are described in Chapter 8 confirm that the present relativity between Sergeants' and Corporals' pay is about right, but suggest that there is a considerable overlap in job sizes at all the ranks between Sergeant and Warrant Officer, and that the differentials between pay bands should be increased in relation to the differentials between ranks.

36. To sum up:

- (i) the pay of new entrants to the Services compares favourably with that of their counterparts in civil life;
- (ii) the average earnings of the civilian comparator to the Corporal increased by about 22 to 25 per cent between 1969 and 1971;
- (iii) the earnings of civilians in jobs comparable in size to those of officers increased by about 16 to 19 per cent between 1969 and 1971;
- (iv) the relativities between the pay of senior NCO's and Warrant Officers and that of junior officers should not be disturbed;
- (v) the present relativity between the pay of Corporals and Sergeants is about right, but between Sergeant and Warrant Officer more emphasis should be placed on differentials between pay bands, and less on differentials between ranks.

It is not practicable to take all these factors fully into account at present. An attempt to do so would require, for example, a reduction in pay or at best little or no increase for the new entrant, coupled with an increase in pay for Corporals which would give a disproportionate reward to the progression from recruit to Corporal and little further increase in pay for promotion between Corporal and Warrant Officer.

### **The X Factor**

37. We have mentioned in a previous chapter the considerations which gave rise to the X factor. They were described more fully in the reports of the NBPI<sup>(1)</sup> and we do not think it necessary to repeat them here. The present level of 5 per cent for men was made subject to a limit of £200 a year, a limit which in 1970 came into effect at the highest point of the pay scale of a Lieutenant-Colonel, but which would, as salaries are increased, take effect at progressively lower levels. We recommend that the upper limit should be increased to £250 so as to restore the position to what it was in 1970. The levels (of 5 per cent for men and 1 per cent for women) were fixed only two years ago and although they were intended to be experimental it is, as yet, too early to recommend changes. This is not to say that there have not been changes in the elements which comprise the X factor. In the last two years the considerable increase in the level of civilian unemployment has made jobs in the Services, and the pay attaching to them, relatively more secure. On the other hand, the degree of turbulence to which soldiers and, to a lesser extent, sailors and airmen are subject, has increased. But we do not think that the balance of disadvantage or advantage has changed significantly.

38. Taking into account these often conflicting factors we have sought to devise pay structures which are compatible with each other and which, taking account of the increase of 7 per cent given in August 1971, reasonably reflect the increases in civilian

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<sup>(1)</sup>Report No. 116, Cmnd. 4079, June 1969 and No. 142, Cmnd. 4291, February 1970.

earnings which have taken place since the last review in 1970. We recommend the introduction, with effect from 1 April 1972, of military salaries based on the following illustrative tables:—

Table 1

Proposed military salary inclusive of X factor: Annual rates for officers<sup>(1)</sup>

Rank	Normal rate
	£
Brigadier ... ..	6,900
Colonel ... ..	5,500–6,200
Lieutenant-Colonel ... ..	4,500–5,000
Major ... ..	3,450–3,950
Captain ... ..	2,650–3,000
Lieutenant ... ..	2,100–2,350
Second Lieutenant ... ..	1,750

Table 2

Proposed military salary inclusive of X factor: Weekly rates for other ranks<sup>(1)</sup>

Scale 'B' (men committed to 6 years or more, but less than 9 years service)	Band		
	1	2	3
	£	£	£
Warrant Officer I ... ..	43.75	46.69	50.26
Warrant Officer II ... ..	41.58	44.52	48.09
Staff Sergeant ... ..	39.55	42.49	46.06
Sergeant ... ..	37.17	40.11	43.68
Corporal I ... ..	33.81	36.75	40.32
Corporal II ... ..	32.55	35.49	—
L/Corporal I ... ..	30.10	33.04	36.61
L/Corporal II ... ..	28.00	30.94	—
L/Corporal III ... ..	26.60	29.54	—
Private I ... ..	26.60	29.54	33.11
Private II ... ..	24.85	27.79	—
Private III ... ..	23.45	26.39	—
Private IV ... ..	21.35	—	—

Scale A—for men committed to less than 6 years' service—deduct £1.82 from the above rates.

Scale C—for men who are committed to, or have completed more than 9 years' service—add £2.73 to the above rates.

<sup>(1)</sup>The existing rates are reproduced at Appendix 1 for the purpose of comparison.

39. If these recommendations are accepted the Ministry of Defence will need to work out the new pay scales in detail. Details of new Service pay scales are normally published as a White Paper; we suggest that on this occasion they should be published as a supplement to this report. We have made our recommendations in terms of weekly or annual rates and we recognise that the present pay system in the Services will require them to be converted into daily rates. We hope, however, that in due course the Services will adopt a system that allows for weekly or annual salaries as is more usual in civil life.

## THE WOMEN'S SERVICES

40. There is, in parallel with each men's Service, a corresponding women's Service and Nursing Service, employing officers and non-commissioned ranks. Of these, the women's Services corresponding to the Royal Navy (WRNS and QARNNS) are not subject to the same statutory requirements as men and are women's Services "administered by the Defence Council". The remaining Services—WRAF and PMRAFNS; and WRAC and QARANC; corresponding to the Royal Air Force and Army respectively, are classed as Military and Air Forces of the Crown and are subject to the same statutes as the men's Services.

41. Many roles in the Services are necessarily reserved for men because women do not undertake combat duties. Some are filled wholly, or almost wholly, by women. But there is a considerable number filled by both men and women in which, in some cases, women are regarded by the Services as fully equivalent to, and interchangeable with, men; for example, an officer or NCO in the women's Services may be in charge of a number of men. Before 1970, servicewomen's basic rates of pay were on average 85 per cent of the corresponding single men's rates, but after taking into account the free food and accommodation which both received the value of women's total emoluments approximated to 90 per cent of men's.

42. The NBPI included some women's trades in its job evaluation studies and came to the conclusion that in trades in which men and women were interchangeable the differences in size between their jobs were not great and were, in some cases, negligible. It therefore recommended that women's trades should be allocated to the same pay bands as had been adopted for the men's trades,<sup>(1)</sup> and that the Services should set themselves the objective of attaining equal pay by 1975 (The Equal Pay Act 1970 had not become law at the time the Board reported.) The levels of pay which it attached to these bands were set at 90 per cent of the corresponding rates for men, excluding the X factor in both cases. This did no more than preserve the relativity which had previously existed. The NBPI did not consider that the X factor element in pay should necessarily be the same for men and for women: conditions of engagement in the women's Services are, in practice, less onerous in some respects than those in the men's Services. The X factor element for men had for the time being been set at 5 per cent and the Board recommended that in the women's Services it should be a token 1 per cent; this should be reviewed if the X factor for men were changed.

43. The effect of these recommendations, which were accepted by the Government, was that total pay rates in the women's Services became, on average, nearly 87 per cent of the rates for men in the corresponding ranks and pay bands of the men's Services.

44. Section 7 of the Equal Pay Act 1970 contains the following provisions about Service pay:

"The Secretary of State or Defence Council shall not make, or recommend to Her Majesty the making of, any instrument relating to the terms and conditions of service of members of the naval, military or air forces of the Crown or of any women's service administered by the Defence Council, if the instrument has the effect of making a distinction, as regards pay, allowances or leave, between men and women who are members of those forces or of any such service, not being a distinction fairly attributable to differences between the obligations undertaken by men and those undertaken by women as such members as aforesaid."

45. It will thus be necessary to ensure that when the work and conditions are equal women receive equal pay with men by 29 December 1975 when the Act comes into

<sup>(1)</sup>A three-band system was recommended in the WRNS, as in the other women's Services. It would not have been appropriate to follow the system adopted for men in the Navy (para. 16 above) since women in the WRNS do not go to sea.

force. Differences may remain, however, if they are fairly attributable to different conditions, such as some of those covered by the X factor, or to differences in committal or other factors where the women's and men's Services are governed by different rules. One difference is particularly significant; women can leave the Services (on marriage or for other reasons) much more easily than men and in fact the majority leave after two years' service or less. For this reason women other ranks do not receive committal pay (i.e. their pay is calculated as a percentage of the men's Scale A) but they receive length-of-service increments after 3 and 6 years, and bonuses are paid to those who complete initial engagements for 6 years.

46. As it is a percentage of servicemen's pay, and thus related to the pay of civilian men whose jobs were used for the purposes of comparison, the pay of the women's Services is already high in relation to the pay that women in general can at present earn outside. We understand, too, that the job evaluation studies carried out by the NBPI showed that some women's trades fall below the lower limit of the men's Band 1 trades; it would be difficult to justify the payment to them of full Band 1 rates. These differences, together with differences in conditions to which we have referred, need further examination. For these reasons, while we think a step towards equal pay should be made, we propose that at this stage it should be a modest one.

47. We recommend that from 1 April 1972 the pay of the women's Services should be increased to 90 per cent of the Scale A rates for men. As we do not recommend any change in the X factor, this will mean that, excluding the X factor in both cases, women's pay rates will be approximately 93½ per cent of the Scale A rates for men.

48. If this recommendation is carried out and women's long service increments, to which we have referred above, are left unchanged, some women will receive more pay than men serving under similar conditions. We do not think this can be justified and accordingly recommend that at the same time as the general increase in women's pay their long service increments should be reduced from £1.47 to £1.19 a week after 3 years and that after 6 years the amount already payable in the WRAC and WRNS viz £2.59 a week should become standard.

## ADDITIONAL PAY AND SPECIAL PAY SCALES

49. We referred in Chapter 2 to a number of special pay scales which differ from those relating to the majority of servicemen; and to additional payments made to servicemen in certain employments. There are also allowances that servicemen can claim in appropriate circumstances. As they are to form an important part of our intended study we consider that for the present most forms of additional payment should continue at their present level. There are, however, a few items that constitute a significant part of the total earnings of the men or women concerned, and because of the fall in the value of money since they were last reviewed it would be inequitable to postpone action on them; it would, in addition, reduce their value as inducements to undertake demanding or hazardous work. We therefore make recommendations in this chapter on the items on which, in our view, some action is needed if only as an interim measure. (It should not be inferred, however, that we believe the present level of any item on which no recommendation is made to be right; or that where we may now make a recommendation we commit ourselves to recommending the eventual continuance of that item of pay in its present form or at all.)

50. We shall deal first of all with committal pay and long service increments of pay which, though not strictly items of additional pay are additions to the basic military salary intended as incentives to extended service, capable of separate consideration. We then consider the more important items of additional pay to which we referred generally in paragraph 49 viz flying pay; submarine pay; diving pay; hard lying money; special service pay (hydrographic); and parachute pay. Finally we turn to special pay scales, where for reasons unconnected with our projected study our recommendations, apart from minimal changes will be deferred.

### Additions to the Basic Military Salary

#### *Committal Pay*

51. Although committal pay, which we described in Chapter 2, is not expressed as a separate emolument it is, nevertheless, an addition to the basic military salary offered as a financial incentive to other ranks to commit themselves to serve for more than the minimum period. The present rates of committal pay, which do not vary according to rank, are £1.47 a week (21p a day) to those committed to serve for six but less than nine years, and £3.78 a week (54p a day) to those committed to serve for nine years or more. During the period of this review the Ministry of Defence has given consideration to the alternative forms of incentive to which the National Board for Prices and Incomes referred in its second report.<sup>(1)</sup> These were:—

- (i) Incremental pay for second and subsequent engagements;
- (ii) Cash payments at the end of service, graded by length of service;
- (iii) Cash payments as inducements to re-engage—a system used to a small extent in the Royal Navy;
- (iv) An extension of (iii) to make such payments at the point of commitment to longer service.

52. The Ministry of Defence, after consideration, has expressed the view that for the time being committal pay should remain in its present form, and perhaps, in view of the forthcoming relaxation in the terms of engagements, a period of consolidation is advisable. But as we have said, retention, i.e. prolongation of service, is becoming increasingly important, and we may need to reconsider alternative forms of incentive if the present methods prove to be inadequate.

53. Because of the high cost of training and other disadvantages to the Armed Forces which accrue from short service it is important, within the present system of committal

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<sup>(1)</sup>NBPI Report No. 116 (Cmnd. 4079), June 1969, Chapter 7.

payments, to offer adequate incentives to men to enlist for more than the minimum period of engagement and to extend their service as early as possible. This will become all the more important with the introduction, in May 1972, of the "Notice Engagement" which will allow servicemen on completion of training and after 1½ years productive service, to give 18 months' notice of leaving. We consider that there should be a substantial increase in this form of incentive and to this end recommend that committal pay should be increased to:

£1.82 a week (26p a day) for committal to a minimum of 6 but less than 9 years' service; and

£4.55 a week (65p a day) for committal to 9 or more years' service.

#### *Length of Service Increments of Pay*

54. Length of service increments of pay (LSP) provide additional rewards for service in excess of nine years and are intended to provide an incentive, for men the Services wish to retain, to prolong their engagements beyond the nine year point. In the past each Service has operated a different pattern of LSP based on its own engagement structure but the Ministry of Defence has now asked us to consider a new pattern of payments which has been devised with the "Notice Engagement" in mind.<sup>(1)</sup> The new pattern, which is set out in the table on the next page, provides for more frequent, but in certain cases smaller, increments in the Navy and RAF in line with the practice in the Army, and though not introducing a uniform system goes a long way towards standardisation. We recommend that it should be adopted.

55. Although the implementation of this recommendation involves in some cases the payment of smaller increments than those payable under current scales, for servicemen newly qualifying for LSP these reductions are offset by provision for earlier payment. For those already in receipt of LSP at rates which, they had no reason to doubt, would continue for the period of their current engagements we believe that, exceptionally, full protection should be afforded. We recommend that where the existing rate of LSP is more favourable than that now recommended it should be retained for the duration of the serviceman's current engagement.

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<sup>(1)</sup>The right to leave the Services at 18 months' notice will, under the new system, be extended automatically to all men and women who have served for 9 years or more.



Table 3

## Length of service increments of pay

Weekly rates after completing the following years' service

	9	12	15	16	18	22
	£	£	£	£	£	£
<b>Royal Navy/Royal Marines</b>						
Able Seaman, Marine I,						
Leading Seaman, Corporal RM	1.40	2.10	—	—	—	—
Petty Officer, Sergeant RM ...	1.75	2.45	—	3.85	—	—
Chief Petty Officer,						
Colour Sgt. RM ... ..	2.10	3.50	—	4.20	—	—
Quartermaster Sergeant, RM ...	2.10	3.50	—	4.55	—	5.60
FCPO/RSM, RM ... ..	2.10	3.50	—	4.55	—	5.95
<b>Army</b>						
Private, Lance Corporal ...	1.40	2.10	—	—	—	—
Corporal ... ..	1.40	2.10	2.45	—	—	—
Sergeant ... ..	1.75	2.45	3.15	—	3.85	—
Staff Sergeant ... ..	1.75	2.45	3.15	—	4.20	—
Warrant Officer, Class II ...	1.75	2.45	3.15	—	4.20	4.90
Warrant Officer, Class I ...	1.75	2.45	3.15	—	4.20	5.95
<b>Royal Air Force</b>						
Leading Aircraftman, Senior						
Aircraftman and Junior Technician	1.40	2.10	—	—	—	—
Corporal ... ..	1.40	2.10	2.45	—	—	—
Sergeant ... ..	1.75	2.45	3.15	—	3.85	—
Chief Technician, Flight Sergeant	1.75	2.45	3.15	—	4.20	—
Warrant Officer ... ..	1.75	2.45	3.15	—	4.20	5.95

**Additional Pay**

56. In the following paragraphs we make recommendations on increases in the forms of additional pay which in our view constitute a significant part of total earnings and which, with one exception, have not been increased for two years or more. We consider that, pending a more complete review, they should be increased by approximately the same percentage as the increase in military salaries since April 1970. We do not think it necessary that the adjustment should be exact and accordingly our recommendations are based on levels of additional pay 18 per cent higher than those current in April 1970. Because, at the same time, we propose certain structural changes, or other considerations apply, this increase cannot be applied "across the board" to existing rates and we therefore set out our recommendations in detail.

*Flying Pay*

57. Flying pay for specialist aircrew was increased by 7 per cent in August 1971, so that in their case only the further increase on this occasion will be slightly less than 11 per cent. With this exception our general recommendation is appropriate to the rates of flying pay, flying instructional pay and crew pay.

*Submarine Pay*

58. We consider that on this occasion the "tapering" which occurred in consequence of the flat rate increase in the rates of submarine pay awarded to all ranks in 1970 should now be reversed by giving rather larger percentage increases to the higher ranks

than to the lower. We recommend accordingly that the rates of submarine pay should be:—

Table 4  
Submarine pay

Rank	Annual rate	Daily rate
	£	£
Lieutenant and above, and SD officers of any rank <sup>(1)</sup> ... ..	511.00	1.40
Sub. Lt., FCPO and CPO ... ..	474.50	1.30
PO ... ..	394.20	1.08
Midshipman, Ldg. Rating and below ... ..	357.70	0.98

<sup>(1)</sup>Sub-Lieutenants (SD) in the submarine service are invariably ex-rating submariners and are employable as part crew without further training. As such they merit the rate of submarine pay paid to Lieutenants and above, and we recommend that this rate should be payable to all SD officers in the submarine service.

#### Diving Pay

59. Diving pay includes a number of different types of payment made to divers in the Royal Navy, Royal Marines and Army. The first, *Special Service Pay (Diving)* (SSP(D)) is a continuous daily rate which bears a general relationship to the intensity of diving carried out by each category of diver. We recommend that with the exception of one category of diver—the Royal Marine Swimmer Canoeist—the new rates should be based on the principle expressed in paragraph 56. This will preserve the existing relationship which appears to be satisfactory. The rates for Royal Marine Swimmer Canoeists were fixed when they were regarded as shallow water divers. Taking account of recent changes in their training and duties which the Ministry of Defence have brought to our notice we recommend that from April 1972 the rates should be as follows:—

Table 5  
Diving pay: rates for Royal Marine Swimmer Canoeists

Type	Annual rate	Daily rate
	£	£
Swimmer Canoeist officer ... ..	255	0.70
Swimmer 1st Class ... ..	255	0.70
Swimmer 2nd Class ... ..	175	0.48
Swimmer 3rd Class ... ..	146	0.40

60. The second type of payment, *Dip Money*, is paid only to divers who undertake specially hazardous or experimental work. It is not paid concurrently with SSP(D). We do not propose any general increase in the rates payable but we note that there is no provision for the payment of "Dip Money" to Experimental Divers for dives to depths of less than 250 feet. We consider that for divers who sometimes have to dive to depths between 181 and 250 feet, breathing compressed air, a payment is desirable and we recommend that it should be at a rate of £0.036 (3.6p) a minute for dives in this range of depths.

61. Finally, we consider the payments made to Submarine Escape Training Tank (SETT) Instructors whose task is to train officers and ratings to escape from and to re-enter submarines. These payments are based on "Dip Money" principles and we recommend that in the case of ratings only they should be increased from 0.8p to 1.0p a minute.

### *Hard Lying Money*

62. This is at present paid (at a rate of 13p a day) to all ranks when serving in ships where the living conditions are especially arduous. It has been suggested that it should be extended to all ships so as to recognise all the disadvantages of life at sea but should be paid at a higher rate for service in the ships where conditions are worst. We do not feel able to accept this suggestion until we have given it further consideration in relation to the financial alleviations (in the way of remissions of food and accommodation charges and the payment of separation allowance) that are already provided for service on board ship or in the field. In the meanwhile, however, we recommend that the rate of hard lying money should be increased to £1.05 a week (15p a day) so as to restore approximately the relation to basic pay that it had in April 1970.

### *Special Service Pay (Hydrographic)*

63. SSP (Hydrographic) is paid on a continuous basis to qualified officers and ratings in the RN Surveying Service at rates varying between £0.70 and £5.60 a week (10p and 80p a day). Members of a survey ship's crew who do not qualify for SSP (Hydrographic) receive Hard Lying Money. We recommend that the new rates should be based on the general principle expressed in paragraph 56 but that exceptionally the lowest rate—which is payable to the Surveying Recorder (Star)—should be the same as the new rate of Hard Lying Money viz £1.05 a week (15p a day).

### *Parachute Pay and Parachute Jumping Instructors' Pay*

64. We recommend that these payments, which do not vary with rank, should be increased to:—

Parachute Pay	£3.08 a week (44p a day)
Parachute Jumping Instructors' Pay	£3.57 a week (51p a day)

65. Finally, we turn to special pay scales.

## **Special Pay Scales**

### *Medical and Dental Officers*

66. The pay of doctors and dentists in the Armed Forces is not directly related to the pay of combatant officers but is designed to provide, before addition of the X factor, average earnings over a career extending from Captain to Colonel equal to the average net earnings of civilian general practitioners in the National Health Service. The pay of medical and dental Brigadiers is determined at a level which provides a reasonable increment over the maximum pay of Colonels and a logical progression to the higher ranks. Thus, the principal factors governing changes in the pay of Service medical and dental officers are the recommendations of the Review Body on Doctors' and Dentists' Remuneration.

67. The provision of medical dental and nursing services to the Armed Forces is at present being reviewed by a Committee appointed by the Secretary of State for Defence, and pending the report of this Committee we think the present link with the pay of NHS practitioners should be continued. We understand that the Review Body on Doctors' and Dentists' Remuneration is likely to make a report about the rates of pay to apply from April 1972 shortly after our present report is completed. We therefore make no recommendations about the pay of medical and dental officers and cadets in this report, but expect the Ministry of Defence to consult us when the new rates of remuneration for civilian doctors are determined.

### *Young Entrants*

68. The pay of apprentices, juniors and young soldiers is at present a complex of ten scales and the Ministry of Defence has put forward proposals for their simplification. We believe that simplification is both desirable and possible, but have had insufficient time to give these proposals the consideration which would enable us to make recommendations in this report. We suggest that in the meantime the rates of pay of young entrants should be increased by the amount required to cover the increases which we recommend in the charges for food and accommodation.

### *Other Special Scales*

69. Certain officers (e.g. Legal and Veterinary Officers and Quartermasters) have special pay scales related (by means of a specific “pay lead” in cash terms, or in other ways) to the general pay scales for officers. In these cases we recommend that the present links with and the leads over combatant pay should be maintained pending a later review.

## CHARGES FOR FOOD AND ACCOMMODATION

### Food Charges

70. Until April 1970, servicemen's meals were provided free; if, however, they were not on the ration strength of their units, for example because they were married men living out of barracks, or because they were on leave for more than 48 hours, they received a ration allowance in lieu of the free food. The basis of the allowance was the retail value of the daily ration, increased by 20 per cent to allow for the extra cost of individual purchases. A further addition (of 8 old pence a day) was made to cover the cost of preparation of the food. In order to avoid the need constantly to recalculate the basic cost of the ration, the rate of ration allowance was adjusted annually to 1 December by reference to a formula based on the food element in the Retail Price Index.

71. Since the introduction of the military salary in April 1970 single servicemen have been required to pay for their food while they are on the ration strength. But they do not pay if they are living out or are on leave for more than 48 hours. The charges are also remitted when men are serving at sea or in the field for two nights or more.

72. The NBPI recommended that when food was provided by the Services it should be charged for at a rate comparable with that paid by a civilian, and that the charge should be calculated by the same formula as had been used for calculating the ration allowance. The resulting charge was to be reduced by 10 per cent to take account of absences of less than 48 hours when, although not taking meals, a man continued to be charged for them. At that time (1970/71) the daily food charge calculated in this way was the equivalent of £2.52 a week (36p a day) i.e. a daily ration allowance of 40p less 10 per cent. On 1 August 1971 the charge was increased to £2.73 a week (39p a day), that is by 8.3 per cent.

73. The method used for abating the food charge for absences is not wholly satisfactory and the total cost of providing servicemen's meals has recently been studied closely by the Ministry of Defence and Civil Service Department. As would be expected, the total cost, including the cost of premises and equipment, and the salaries of cooks, etc, exceeds the retail value of the rations by a considerable margin. Indeed, the total cost approximated, at the time of the study, to a daily average of 70p a head. The charge paid by the serviceman exceeds the bare cost of the food he eats but makes little contribution to the cost of overheads. We have, therefore, been asked to review the basis of the charge. In doing so, we shall take account of experiments with a "pay as you dine" system conducted by the Services in 1970/71 under which servicemen would pay only for the meals they ate.

74. This review cannot be carried out before 1 April 1972, the date on which our general recommendations are intended to become operative. Meanwhile we recommend that the food charge from 1 April 1972 should be calculated on the existing basis and should be £2.94 a week (42p a day).

### Accommodation Charges

75. Accommodation, like food, was in principle provided free until April 1970. Married men received a marriage allowance but had to pay either a charge for public married quarters or the rent of private accommodation. The charge for public married quarters was below the general level of rents in civil life, the difference being intended partly as compensation for the frequent moves that occur in Service life and also because the marriage allowance paid before 1 April 1970 was rarely increased. Married men for whom the Services were unable to provide married quarters received a higher rate of marriage allowance.

76. Since the introduction of the military salary the policy of the Services has been to bring charges for accommodation into line with the amounts a civilian would have to pay in similar circumstances. The proposal put forward by the NBPI, which was accepted by the Government, was that rents for other ranks' married quarters should be based

on the average rents charged for Local Authority houses of similar standards. To these rents would be added charges in lieu of rates; charges for the furniture provided by the Services; and the cost of maintenance and decoration which the Services undertake, to the extent that this is more than is generally carried out by Local Authorities. It was originally intended that the rents for officers' married quarters should be so calculated as to put them in a comparable position to civilians who were buying houses on mortgage, but this proved to be impracticable. Instead, officers' married quarters rents were calculated in a similar way (allowing for differences in the standard of accommodation) to those of other ranks.

77. The rents calculated by the NBPI and set out in their Report of February 1970 were based on the average of Local Authority rents in April 1968, since this was the latest information then available. Even so, they represented very big increases on the rents that had been charged hitherto and the Board recommended, following the policy which the Government had applied by statute to Local Authorities, that the new rents should be introduced in stages (except for the smallest—Type A—quarters). The first stage of the increase was applied in April 1970 and was intended to apply until the next review which was then expected to be in April 1972. The NBPI hoped to bring Service and civilian rents into line at that time in relation to the latest information which would be obtainable. In the event, the Government decided that rents should be increased by 7 per cent in August 1971 at the same time as the interim increase in military salaries.

78. Using the most recent statistics of the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants—those for April 1971—together with newly calculated figures for rates, furniture and additional maintenance, we have made an assessment of new levels of accommodation charges which, if adopted, would represent large increases—ranging from 18 to 38 per cent—over present charges and smaller, though still substantial, increases over the unstaged level of charges considered appropriate in 1970. That they should be so high is not unexpected as they would encompass the remaining element of staged charges not already accounted for by the increase which was implemented in August 1971 and in addition reflect increases in Local Authority rents over the period from April 1968 to April 1971. In our view, the introduction of such large increases in April 1972 might cause hardship in some instances which would not be alleviated in present circumstances by any scheme for rent rebates.

79. Military salaries are based on the principle that servicemen's pay and the charges they have to meet are fair in relation to the pay received and the corresponding expenses borne by civilians. It is important that this principle should be maintained. We are not convinced, however, that it is altogether fair to compare the rents for married quarters with the rents of Local Authority houses in the way that has been attempted so far. A large proportion of servicemen have married quarters or hirings provided for them and their families during most of their service, whereas in other occupations the employer does not generally provide housing for his workers. But servicemen have to find their own accommodation when they leave the Services. If they wish to buy their own houses they may be at a disadvantage, in a time of rising house prices, compared with civilians who start buying their houses earlier in their careers. We wish to consider this question further and meanwhile recommend that the accommodation charges to be introduced in April 1972 should be calculated by the addition of  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent to the unstaged rates recommended by the NBPI in 1970. On this basis, the charges will be:—

Table 6

**Officers' and other ranks' married quarters  
Existing and proposed charges**

Type of quarter	Existing annual charge	Proposed charge	
		Annual	Daily
<b>Other ranks</b>	£	£	£
A ... ..	120.12	135.05	0.37
B ... ..	171.08	204.40	0.56
C ... ..	189.28	237.25	0.65
D/W.O. ... ..	211.12	273.75	0.75
<b>Officers</b>			
V <sup>(1)</sup> ... ..	281.05	324.85	0.89
IV <sup>(1)</sup> ... ..	324.85	375.95	1.03
III <sup>(1)</sup> ... ..	354.05	423.40	1.16
II <sup>(1)</sup> ... ..	412.45	478.15	1.31
I <sup>(1)</sup> ... ..	456.25	532.90	1.46

<sup>(1)</sup>Including garage charges of £25.55 a year.

80. Following the general policy of requiring servicemen to pay charges similar to those civilians have to meet, single servicemen when provided with accommodation in barracks or messes (but not when serving at sea or in the field) are charged a rent intended to cover the space used for sleeping, eating and living space, with small elements for heat, light and service. The charges are calculated as a proportion of the rents of married quarters; for officers, half the rent of the married quarter, excluding garage charge, to which they would be entitled if married; for junior other ranks one quarter, and for Senior NCOs one half, of the rent of a Type C married quarter. Charges for heat and light are added in each case. These charges were introduced in full in April 1970, based on the calculated rents for married quarters without staging. They were not increased in August 1971 and we think that on this occasion the new charges which we recommend should again be based on the full calculation of charges and should be introduced in full. They are:—

Table 7  
**Charges for single quarters**

Rank	Existing annual charge	Proposed charge	
		Annual	Daily
<b>Standard Accommodation</b>	£	£	£
Corporal and below ... ..	58.24	69.35	0.19
WO and SNCO ... ..	113.88	135.05	0.37
Captain and below ... ..	145.20	171.55	0.47
Major ... ..	177.96	208.05	0.57
Lieutenant-Colonel and above ... ..	198.96	233.60	0.64
<b>Senior Officers occupying single rooms</b>			
Major ... ..	155.88	182.50	0.50
Lieutenant-Colonel and above ... ..	177.12	208.05	0.57

81. There should be no change in the basis of calculation of charges for sub-standard married and single accommodation.

82. The increases we recommend are, nevertheless, large and may cause hardship in some cases, e.g. junior ranks who by virtue of family size occupy a large and correspondingly expensive quarter. We recommend that when such cases are identified they should be dealt with by administrative action. As a wholly exceptional measure we recommend that in the case of Second Lieutenants and equivalent ranks serving on 31 March 1972 the existing rates of accommodation charge should continue until we next review them.



## JOB EVALUATION OF SENIOR NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND WARRANT OFFICERS

83. The need for further job evaluation studies at the level of Sergeant and above was foreshadowed in the NBPI Report No. 142 (Chapter 2) and the Board and the Ministry of Defence initiated these studies in June 1970. The Ministry of Defence and OME continued them after the Board had been abolished and they were well advanced by the time we were appointed.

84. A detailed account of the background to these studies, the methods adopted and the results is given in Appendix 2. The results tend, on the whole, to confirm the allocations to pay bands made in 1970. Indeed, between 80 and 90 per cent of the trades at these higher levels have been confirmed in their present bands. But in the remaining instances a pay band higher or lower than the present one has been shown to be appropriate at one or more ranks in certain trades. On promotion, therefore, men in these trades ought to move into different bands from those that were appropriate at the lower rank and this may in certain instances give rise to difficulties. To understand these difficulties it is necessary, briefly, to examine some of the implications of job evaluation for the salary structure.

85. It has been suggested to us that the system of job evaluation which has been employed at the ranks of Sergeant and above is, because of its emphasis on managerial requirements, inadequate for the measurement of jobs which are not managerial in character, and may thus be at the root of the problems which have emerged. But a non-managerial job is unlikely to carry as much weight as one which is managerial so long as the jobs of senior NCOs and Warrant Officers are deemed by the Services to be, in general, managerial in character. It was, in fact, these managerial characteristics which the system was designed to measure. We do not therefore subscribe to the view that it is necessary to devise new job evaluation systems for the solution of the problems that have arisen.

86. The studies demonstrate a large overlap in job sizes between ranks. Thus, although, for example, the average Sergeant has a smaller job than the average Staff Sergeant, who in turn has a smaller job than the average Warrant Officer, some Sergeants are doing bigger jobs than some Staff Sergeants, and indeed than some Warrant Officers. There are extreme cases in which the job size in a trade is substantially the same at all ranks from Sergeant to Warrant Officer Class I, and it will be apparent that a job which at the rank of Sergeant may be highly skilled or responsible in relation to other Sergeants may well be a good deal less so in relation to Warrant Officers.

### **Implications for Pay**

87. Rank in the Armed Forces is awarded for a number of reasons of which an increase in job size is not always the most important. The overlap to which we have referred is not, therefore, unexpected and is in fact reflected to some extent in the existing pay structure. Thus a Sergeant in Band 3 earns more than a Staff Sergeant in Band 2 or a Warrant Officer Class II in Band 1. The studies now completed suggest that above the rank of Sergeant the differences in job size between pay bands (which should be reflected in pay if job evaluation results are to be applied consistently) are even more important in relation to the differences between ranks than was previously supposed but we were not able, in framing our recommendations on the pay of other ranks, to give this evidence the weight which we think it should have in the longer term.

88. It appears, however, that the present relationship between Corporals and Sergeants is about right. We made a subsidiary study of Service trades at the rank of Sergeant using the same factor plan as had been used by the NBPI at the rank of Corporal. This system places the main emphasis on physical and mental rather than managerial skills and may not therefore fully reflect the managerial elements in the Sergeant's job. But it gave results which corresponded closely to those obtained under the "management" factor plan to which we have referred and we conclude that at the rank of Sergeant the

differences between the two systems are not very material. On the whole, Sergeants in Band 1 and Band 2 trades were found to have jobs equivalent to those of Corporals in Bands 2 and 3 respectively and we conclude that a Sergeant in Band 1 should be paid about the same as a Corporal in Band 2; and a Sergeant in Band 2 should be paid about the same as a Corporal in Band 3. This is, approximately, the present relationship.

89. The pay structure we have recommended in Chapter 4 illustrates the difficulties which the full implementation of the job evaluation results would involve. An upward change, or retention of the same band, on promotion would present no difficulty, but a downward change in band would impose, in general, a reduction in pay; or at best, between Corporal and Sergeant, a very small increase. Understandably, the Services would find such downward changes unacceptable if they had such pay consequences. For the time being, therefore, the results of the present studies have been held in abeyance; that is, there will be no changes from the present pay bands until the Services have had time to consider the implications of the studies and the courses of action which are open to them.

90. We can appreciate the reasons why the Armed Forces management needed to postpone action. Clearly, a change in pay band involving an actual reduction in pay would be impracticable. But the technique of job evaluation which the Armed Forces have adopted did not create a set of relativities to last for all time. As in any industry, techniques and equipment are constantly changing and with them organisations and the relative importance of jobs. Accordingly, as job evaluation is recognised to be a continuing process, it must be accepted that from time to time jobs, or even whole trades, may change in value and move up, or down, in band. The remedy for the latter is to seek the positive solutions which might make such action unnecessary. It would be premature to state with certainty what these may be, but we suggest that as a first step the study of alternative rank structures to fit the job sizes required in the trades concerned would be of value; or perhaps the determination of a pay band which represents a fair average for all ranks in a trade. Again, the re-definition of the requirements of a trade at each rank, coupled with job enlargement and/or the elimination of some ranks might provide a solution in certain cases.

91. Within the job evaluation systems which have formed the basis of extensive studies carried out so thoroughly, on behalf of the Services, the NBPI and ourselves by the Joint Services Job Evaluation Team, we see no reason why a way should not be found out of the difficulties we have described. We accordingly recommend that the Services management should examine the problem areas and put forward detailed proposals with the aim of resolving the difficulties by, at the latest, 1974. If this is to be achieved, we would hope to be able to discuss these proposals with the Services during the present year. It seems likely that one reason for the seeming intractability of some of the difficulties is that servicemen have not been fully prepared for them. We therefore recommend that the job evaluation systems used by the Services, their implications for servicemen, and even the difficulties to which their use may give rise should be given the widest possible publicity in Service units.

## CONCLUSIONS

92. Service pay was last reviewed in April 1970. Our present proposals on military salaries will mean that, taking into account the 7 per cent interim increase awarded by the Government in August 1971, it will have increased at an average annual rate of about 9 per cent compound, that is by a total of about 18½ per cent, or slightly more than the average increase in prices, over the two years since the previous review. The effect on the total of Service pay, additional pay and allowances is slightly less than this since the changes in additional pay and allowances which we recommended in Chapter 6 do not apply to all the items that go to make up the total. The new pay scales we have recommended in paragraph 38 (Chapter 4) would increase the current pay of individual servicemen by amounts ranging from as little as 2 per cent to about 14 per cent. For women, because a step towards equal pay has been proposed, the increases are somewhat higher; the recommendations in paragraphs 47 and 48 (Chapter 5) represent increases ranging from 5 to 16 per cent. Taking the men's and women's Services together, the average increases in pay are about 10 per cent for officers and, including committal pay and length of service increments of pay, about 11 per cent for other ranks.

93. In Chapter 7 we have recommended increases in charges which are estimated to represent an increase of £7.8m. (about 15 per cent) in the total amount servicemen pay for food and accommodation. We intend to review the basis on which these charges are calculated, having in mind particularly the need to be sure that the charges are fair in relation to the costs borne by civilians and to the special circumstances of service men and women. In this connection we shall need to consider the implications for the Services of Government policy towards local authority housing and the proposed introduction of a general scheme for rent rebates.

94. In arriving at our recommendations we have kept in mind that the national interest requires the Armed Forces to be kept up to the strength deemed necessary by the Government and to be manned by men and women who feel they are being treated fairly in relation to their civilian counterparts. We have also kept in mind the Government's anxiety, in the national interest, to bring about a reduction in the rate of increase in money incomes. In doing so we have sought to achieve a reasonable balance between these two factors.

95. If civilian earnings continue to increase in the period after April 1972 the pay of the Services will begin to fall behind again. This is unavoidable when pay is determined by comparisons with other earnings, as it is not only for the Services but for many other groups as well. Such a situation can only be acceptable if the period between reviews is not too long and the rate of increase in the earnings of the groups used for comparison is not too great. We have taken note of the Government's view that Services' pay should normally be reviewed at two-yearly intervals but, so long as civilian earnings are increasing as rapidly as they are, there might be a serious injustice if Service pay were left unchanged for a period as long as two years. Accordingly we shall keep Service pay under continuing review and shall feel free to put forward recommendations on particular aspects of the subject when we believe them to be necessary.

Military salaries introduced on 1 August 1971

Table 1  
Officers: Annual rates

Rank	Normal rate
	£
Brigadier ... ..	6,136
Colonel ... ..	4,968-5,610
Lieutenant-Colonel ... ..	4,103-4,515
Major ... ..	3,124-3,555
Captain ... ..	2,402-2,734
Lieutenant ... ..	1,971-2,186
Second Lieutenant ... ..	1,719

Table 2  
Other ranks: Weekly rates

Scale 'B' (men committed to 6 years or more but less than 9 years service)	Band		
	1	2	3
	£	£	£
Warrant Officer I ... ..	40.04	42.28	45.29
Warrant Officer II ... ..	38.15	40.39	43.40
Staff Sergeant ... ..	35.91	38.15	41.16
Sergeant ... ..	33.67	35.91	38.92
Corporal I ... ..	30.31	32.55	35.56
Corporal II ... ..	29.19	31.43	—
L/Corporal I ... ..	26.95	29.19	32.20
L/Corporal II ... ..	25.41	27.65	—
L/Corporal III ... ..	24.29	26.53	—
Private I ... ..	24.29	26.53	29.54
Private II ... ..	23.17	25.41	—
Private III ... ..	22.05	24.29	—
Private IV ... ..	20.23	—	—

Scale A—for men committed to less than 6 years service—deduct £1.47 from the above rates.  
Scale C—for men who are committed to, or have completed more than 9 years service—add £2.31 to the above rates.

JOB EVALUATION

Senior NCO/Warrant Officer Study

**Introduction**

1. The job evaluation studies of other ranks carried out in 1969 by a Joint Services Job Evaluation team on behalf of the NBPI and described in its Report No. 142 (Chapter 2 and Appendix 6), were carried out mainly at the rank of Corporal. Some studies were made of senior ranks at Sergeant and Staff Sergeant level but these did not produce an entirely consistent relationship with junior ranks and it was concluded that the system employed, which was devised with the Corporal level in mind, was not adequate to deal with the management elements in many jobs at the higher rank levels. There was insufficient time for a further detailed study of the higher rank levels and accordingly similar bandings to those proposed at the Corporal level were recommended. Certain trades<sup>(1)</sup> exist only above Corporal level. Navy artificers and mechanics, which in effect exist mainly at Petty Officer and Chief Petty Officer level, had previously been paid rates comparable with technicians and other trades in the Army and RAF which were allocated to Band 3. Such examinations as were made of the rank of these naval technicians confirmed this link and the NBPI recommended that they should be paid in Band 3 when qualified. In the other Services they proposed in general that trades which existed only above Corporal level should maintain their existing relative positions.

2. The NBPI recommended (Report No. 142 para, 17) that the problems of evaluation at the level of Sergeant and above should be further studied to see whether a satisfactory system could be developed capable of handling the more managerial skills required in these ranks.

3. This recommendation was accepted by the Ministry of Defence. A feasibility study was carried out under the supervision of NBPI staff and of consultants retained by them. The conclusion reached was that the system developed was workable and should, with minor amendments, be used for a main study. Certain problems had come to light and it was apparent that under a factor plan designed to assess managerial skills<sup>(2)</sup> certain trades which at Senior NCO and Warrant Officer level were substantially operative (i.e. used skills of hand and eye) would compare adversely with trades where the main skills were managerial. However, the Services considered that rank was primarily awarded for managerial skills and this was therefore the appropriate criterion.

**The Joint Services Job Evaluation Team**

4. The ad-hoc team which had carried out the studies in 1969 was reconstituted in June 1970 to carry out the feasibility study. It continued in being to carry out the main study. Several of the original staff were made available so that there was some continuity in the work. The team was put on a permanent footing from 1 September 1971. As in 1969 it consisted of Service Officers, Warrant Officers and Senior NCOs with the addition from time to time of members of the NBPI's (later OME's) Enquiry Team. New members of the team were trained by the consultants and other team members in interviewing techniques and the writing of job descriptions, so as to maintain the continuity which is of such importance in this work.

**Judging Panel**

5. A judging panel was set up consisting of an officer of Colonel rank from each Service with a consultant as chairman and a member of the NBPI (later OME) staff as observer. A member of the staff of the Civil Service Department also acted as occasional

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<sup>(1)</sup>The word "trade" is used to refer to different kinds of work in the Services. These are not necessarily trades as the word is used in civil life.

<sup>(2)</sup>The term "managerial skills" is used to cover planning, motivation, supervision, checking and accountability.

observer. The judges were as in 1969 so chosen as to reflect the preponderance of skills in their Services and as far as possible to produce a balance between the combat, engineering and technical skills exercised by the ranks/trades under study. Two of the judges had served on the judging panel for the 1969 study and their expertise and the continuity provided were of great value in what proved to be a much more difficult exercise.

### The Factor Plan

6. Following discussion between the Ministry of Defence and the NBPI and with the advice of the consultants a factor plan was devised for the feasibility study which:

- a) related to all or most of the Senior NCO/Warrant Officer trades in all services;
- b) differentiated between their jobs;
- c) enabled the essential and distinctive elements of those jobs to be described.

The factors defined, detailed in paragraph 8 below, also took account of those management skills associated with planning, supervision, checking and accountability which were a significant aspect of the Senior NCO's and Warrant Officer's roles.

7. Consideration was given to the weightings to be attached to each factor. It was agreed that:—

- a) previous training and experience was relatively less important at Senior NCO/Warrant Officer levels than at the Corporal level. This was because a man's training had usually been completed by the time he became a Senior NCO and he was generally employed more as a manager or supervisor than as an exponent of his particular trade skills.
- b) the factors which in combination represented "command skills" i.e. freedom of action and responsibility for supervision taken together were more important than previous training and experience.
- c) working environment was a relatively less important factor than at Corporal level.

Various factor weightings were tested during the feasibility study. Weightings which produced a credible order of jobs while taking into account the values of the Armed Forces, and which could confidently be expected to measure the success or otherwise of the way in which job requirements fitted into the rank structure, were adopted for the main study. They are shown against the factors in paragraph 8 below. It was apparent that at the ranks of Sergeant and Chief Technician (RAF) there was some ambiguity as to whether their role was primarily managerial or skill orientated and it was therefore decided that the trades exercised at that level would be judged also against the skill-orientated factor plan previously used to evaluate the jobs of Corporals.

8. The factors and weightings used for the main study were:

Factor	<i>Number of levels</i>	<i>Maximum points</i>
Previous training and experience	5	260
Analysis and assessment	4	120
Freedom of action	4	160
Planning requirements	4	100
Responsibility for supervision	4	200
Responsibility for materials, equipment and classified and in-confidence information	4	100
Working environment	3	60
		<hr style="width: 100%; border: 0.5px solid black;"/> 1,000 <hr style="width: 100%; border: 0.5px solid black;"/>

### Benchmarks

9. As a preliminary to the judging process the Services were invited to nominate benchmark jobs which in their opinion typified each level of the seven factors. The term "benchmark" was used to indicate a practical example of a specific case; for example the Warrant Officer Class I Artificer Sergeant Major (Telecommunications) REME was selected as an example of a high level of training and experience.

10. Examples of jobs chosen as benchmarks were studied by the judging panel and were either used, at the intended or another level, or discarded. Those used were awarded points. The inspection of benchmark jobs which took two months performed two functions. It enabled the judges to supplement their experience of one Service and become familiar with a wide range of jobs in each Service in the field. Also, in reaching agreement on the level of activities and the points to be awarded to each benchmark job, they had an opportunity to resolve differences of opinion and approach and develop common standards of judging before the main exercise started.

### **Selection of Tasks and Trades for Study**

11. The criteria adopted for selection of rank/trades for full evaluation were that:—
- a) attention should be concentrated on the most populous trades;
  - b) there should be as full a cover as possible of the spread of jobs in terms of job size in each rank;
  - c) sufficient cover should be provided both by trade and rank within a trade to facilitate the allocation to pay bands of rank/trades not fully evaluated;
  - d) only established posts should be evaluated;
  - e) tradesmen employed in jobs outside their trade e.g. seamen on gate security duties ashore or infantrymen employed at the MOD should not be investigated.
- 275 rank/trades including 14 women's rank/trades were fully investigated and evaluated.

### **Preparation of Job Descriptions**

12. During the feasibility study it was found that due to the complexity of the jobs under study and also the great diversity of employment within any rank/trade it was extremely difficult to integrate observations of a number of jobs into a composite description for any particular rank/trade. Consequently, for the main study it was decided that composite descriptions would be replaced by separate job descriptions for sufficient jobs within each rank/trade to ensure that there was coverage of the typical range of employments. The three Services were asked to provide information as to the deployment of personnel within each rank/trade and to advise on the selection of typical jobs for study. They were also asked to provide a brief note of untypical employments so that their effect on overall job size could be considered during the evaluation process.

### **Judging Process**

13. The process of awarding points to rank/trades was very similar to that operating in the Corporal study. One difference was the requirement to judge individual job descriptions as opposed to composite rank/trade descriptions. This considerably reduced the onus placed on judges of interpreting the tasks of the rank/trades in their own Services.
14. The system of checks and balances operating during the judging process were:—
- a) a unanimous decision was required for each score under each factor.
  - b) individual judges were required to accept responsibility for their collective decisions outside the judging panel, but were debarred from discussing individual scores.
  - c) each Service judge was, in effect, always in a minority so that no Service could attempt, consciously or unconsciously, to gain special treatment for one of its jobs.
  - d) factor scores were subject to regular rationalisation to ensure that appropriate relativities were created and maintained.
  - e) total scores were not calculated until the end of the judging. This avoided preconceptions about whole-job relativities affecting judgements of factors.
  - f) where the judges could not reach agreement the chairman had the authority to withdraw the rank/trade in question.

These rules protected the integrity of the system and enabled the judges to judge all the jobs as objectively as possible. Each judge had to ensure that, within these bounds, the results were sensible and acceptable within the distinctive culture of his own Service, but he was not primarily an advocate or protagonist of his own Service's interests.

## Results

15. The points scores resulting from the judging process showed that:—

- a) there was a broad points range at each rank level which fully justified at least three pay bands. Table 1 shows the maximum and minimum scores and the range of points for each rank.

Table 1

Rank	Minimum score	Maximum score	Range
Sergeant ... ..	160	515	355
Chief Technician (RAF only) ... ..	274	660	386
Staff Sergeant ... ..	200	716	516
Warrant Officer Class II (including Chief Artificer/Mechanician RN)	279	753	474
Warrant Officer Class I ... ..	315	822	507

- b) there was a very considerable points overlap between each rank and every other rank. Whilst both minimum and maximum scores tended to increase with rank there was no clear relationship between rank and job size. Within each trade however there was generally a positive relationship between rank and job size. There were only six trades in which the total points score for one rank was less than that of a lower rank. There were a further sixteen instances of the score of one rank being less than ten per cent more than the score of a lower rank in the same trade.

## Pay Banding

16. In the absence of any clear relationship between rank and job size a pay banding system based on job size could only be obtained by adopting one of two broad methods i.e.

- a) dividing the total points scored for all Senior NCO/Warrant Officer ranks into bands and paying all ranks according to job size (perhaps with a small rank increment);
- b) grading bands so that as rank increased a bigger job size was generally required.

The implications of the first alternative would require extensive study which could not have been completed in time for the current pay review. It was therefore decided to proceed with the study on the basis of the second alternative.

17. In considering the number of pay bands there should be at the Senior NCO and Warrant Officer levels it was borne in mind that the existing three band system was less than two years old, was generally accepted and understood and was administratively convenient. The wide range of points at each rank meant that a lesser number of bands than three would result in too wide a spread of job sizes in each band. Alternatively there seemed no advantage in a large number of bands at the higher rank levels since the pay differentials between the three existing bands were not very big in relation to the salaries paid at these ranks. Accordingly, it was decided to assume that a three band system would be maintained.



### Evaluation of Sergeants and Chief Technicians under the Skill Orientated Factor Plan

18. Trades exercised at the rank of Sergeant and Chief Technician (RAF) were also evaluated under the skill orientated factor plan used for Corporals in 1969. The evaluation was carried out by two members of the judging panel who had been engaged on the Corporal study and the results were closely scrutinised by the consultant chairman of the panel.

The results of the judging showed that as far as Sergeants were concerned:—

- a) there was a high degree of correlation between the order of scores of trades under the two factor plans.
- b) Differences emerged when the results were compared with trades fully evaluated at the rank of Corporal in 1969. There was a relatively high degree of correlation between Corporal trades and the same trades at the rank of Sergeant evaluated under the skill orientated factor plan, but only a moderate degree of correlation between the Corporal evaluations and those of Sergeants in the same trades under the managerial factor plan. Thus use of the skill orientated plan caused less disturbance to the Corporal results extended up one rank than did use of the management orientated plan.
- c) there was a large points overlap between Corporal and Sergeant scores under the skill orientated factor plan as Table 2 shows.

**Table 2**  
**Points ranges for Sergeants and Corporals**

	Minimum points	Maximum points	Range
Corporal ... ..	232	627	395
Sergeant ... ..	397*	759*	362*

\*These points cannot be related in any way to those shown in Table 1 at page 30.

19. As far as Chief Technicians were concerned there were insufficient trades in the study to produce a band structure. But evaluations of established posts demonstrated that the management orientated factor plan was appropriate for this rank level. A large number of Chief Technicians are, however, employed in posts established for other (usually lower) rank levels, an unsatisfactory situation which creates some doubt as to their overall role.

### Allocation of Rank/Trades not Fully Evaluated

20. Once the band structure had been decided it was necessary for the judges to allocate to pay bands those remaining rank/trades that had not been fully evaluated. Job descriptions for these rank/trades were prepared by the Service authorities and were compared with evaluated rank/trades. This process proved to be much more difficult than in the Corporal study, mainly because of the number of ranks within each trade and the inconsistency of job size in relation to rank within certain trades demonstrated by the evaluation process. It became apparent that a relatively large number of further evaluations would be necessary before all rank/trades could be finally allocated to a pay band. A number of priority cases were examined but it proved impossible to complete the task in time for the current pay review.

### Pay Banding of Corporals

21. The evaluation of Sergeant trades under both the management and skill orientated factor plans throws doubt on some of the allocations of Corporal trades not fully evaluated in 1969. These trades were evaluated at the rank of Corporal under the skill orientated factor plan as a matter of priority at the same time as the priority evaluations

mentioned in paragraph 20 above. The results of these evaluations showed that some trades were in too high a band at Corporal level, but that only about 1 or 2 per cent of all Corporals would be affected.

### **Interpretation of Results**

22. The results of the studies confirm the allocations to pay bands made in 1970 in between 80 and 90 per cent of the trades at ranks from Sergeant to Warrant Officer Class I. But in the remaining trades, at some ranks, it appears that pay bands higher or lower than the present ones would be appropriate. We discuss, in Chapter 8, the problems which will face the Services in implementing the findings of these studies and put forward some suggestions which may help to resolve them.