The history of the Battle of Jutland is probably a closed book to most Communicators, and I doubt whether many of us, including the author of this article until starting some research, could give an account of the circumstances in which Admiral Jellicoe hoisted the famous signal "Equal Speed Charlie London", which is displayed over the entrance of the Signal School lounge in Mountbatten Block and is use as our distinctive blazer badge.

  The story of the battle makes fascinating reading, and gave rise to endless controversy for many years after the war. The following account is no more than a very brief sketch of the events leading up to the deployment of the main Dreadnought Battle Fleet, which was effected by "Equal Speed Charlie London". To those of you who would like to obtain a clear picture of the whole battle, I would warmly commend Captain Donald Macintyre's recent book "Jutland" which gives a most readable survey of the encounter.

  In May 1916, both the British Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet were spoiling for a fight. The German Commander, Admiral Scheer knew well that he had insufficient forces to take on the whole British Fleet, and had made plans to lure out the British Battle Cruiser Fleet from Rosyth and deal with it before the Dreadnoughts of the Battle Fleet could come south from Scapa Flow in support.

  He did not however, take into account the efficiency of the Admiralty's radio intercept service, and when he made his sailing signal at 3.40 on the afternoon of 30th May, it was duly intercepted and was available in the Admiralty at 5 p.m. The Grand Fleet at Scapa under the Command of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, flying his flag in the Iron Duke, and the Battlecruiser Fleet at Rosyth under the Command of Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, together with the 5th Battle Squadron immediately put to sea to await eventualities.

  At 2 p.m. the next day, the Dreadnought Battle Fleet was in Organisation No. 5. Divisions in line ahead disposed abeam to starboard in the order 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Divisions, screened by the Fourth, Eleventh and Twelfth Flotillas, with cruisers and destroyers some sixteen miles ahead, spread eight miles apart on a line roughly at right angles to the line of advance of the main body. Admiral Beatty's Battlecruisers and the 5th Battle Squadron were about 30 miles south-east of the main battle fleet.

  At 2.20 p.m. the first enemy sighting report was made, and by 4 p.m. Beatty's ships were hotly engaged with the German Battlecruiser Fleet commanded by Admiral Hipper which was some way ahead of Scheer's High Seas Fleet.

  Initially, Admiral Jellicoe received good intelligence of the engagements, but as the battle developed, Beatty's force received heavy damage, and reports came less frequently. By 6 p.m. when Jellicoe was close enough to give full support, he was still ignorant of the exact position of the enemy main battlefleet, and could not therefore deploy his ships into battle line. At 6.14 he received the information he needed and at 6.15 he made his deployment signal.

  The actual signal made during this critical period have been extracted from the official despatches of the battle and are shown in the Table. The actual formation of the battlefleet after each manoeuvre is shown roughly in Diagram I. (I am sorry if it bears a rather close resemblance to a resultant order problem in a Fleetwork paper!). The approximate relative positions of the two main fleets during and after the deployment are shown in Diagrams 2 and 3.

  There was of course a great deal of argument as to whether Admiral Jellicoe should have deployed earlier, and whether he did in face deploy the best way. Captain Macintyre's assessment is favourable: "The deployment of the Grand Fleet, in the nick of time and in spite of sparse and inaccurate intelligence, in the manner most perfect to bring a devastating concentration of fire on to a portion of the enemy fleet was a masterpiece of fleet manoeuvre that has rarely been equalled and never excelled."

  But there were many historians who felt that Jellicoe missed his chances and should have deployed to the southward thereby engaging the enemy on an opposite course. I think, an impartial study of the facts would tend to support Captain Macintyre's viewpoint.

  There is however, one aspect on which all were agreed, and that was the efficiency of the communications departments. Here, perhaps I may be allowed to quote the late Commander Holloway H. Frost of the United States. He stated "We must heartily commend the visual communication system of the Grand Fleet. We particularly like the laconic wording and the great rapidity with which the dispatches were sent from ship to ship. Radio communication was also very rapid and the errors were kept to a very small percentage. During nearly two years of war, the entire communication system had grown to be very efficient and it is doubtful that it can be equalled even today, despite many technical improvements."

  As to the final outcome of the battle itself, here again there are many conflicting views. There is no doubt that we lost a greater number of ships and men that the Germans but against this must be set the fact that never again did the German High Seas Fleet venture to sea until its fateful scuttling in Scapa Flow at the end of the war.

References:
Battle of Jutland 1916 - Official Despatches. H.M.S.O. 1920
The Battle of Jutland, Holloway H Frost, Stevens and Brown Ltd, London 1936.
Jutland, Donald Macintyre, Evans Bros, Ltd. 1957