Great Britain | 1. The use of submarines for war purposes should be totally abolished. 2. For purposes of coast defence the submarine is comparatively ineffective, but its special capacity for long endurance and its increasing torpedo and gun armaments constitute powers for offensive action of no mean order. 3. The retention of submarines will always be a danger that their employment in the hands of an unscrupulous enemy will lead to methods of attack which civilised nations regards with horror. 4. While British shipping suffered most severely in the last war, any one of the Powers might be in a equally difficult position if war broke out again. 5. If the submarine could be regarded as a defensive weapon, the British Empire could show a greater need than any other Power. Yet we are prepared unreservedly to surrender such protection as submarines are argued to afford. 6. The conditions under which submarine crews have to live are hardly in keeping with the improved conditions for industrial workers which all nations consistently urge at Geneva. 7. In 12 mishaps to submarines of the Five Powers since 1918, 570 men have lost their lives. 8. If the Conference fails to abolish the submarine it will miss a great opportunity but the British Government will then endeavour to confine the submarine to defence by limiting it strictly both in size and in numbers. 9. We should seek to revive the agreement signed in Washington in 1922 but not fully ratified by the signatory Powers, to regulate the attack of merchant ships by submarines. |
United States | 1. The American Delegation is in favour of the abolition of the submarine. 2. Offensive use has been made of it at great distances from its home ports 3. Ton for ton it is more costly than any type of surface craft and approximately twice as costly as the largest ships of war. 4. The essential objection to the submarine is that it is a weapon particularly susceptible to abuse. 5. The threat of its unrestricted abuse against merchant ships brought America into WW1 6. Its abolition will suppress costly weapons and eliminate the dreadful experiences of the past. | France | 1. France' Metropolitan and Colonial situation required the use of the submarine. 2. Its use can be controlled and regulated like any other warship. 3. It is a defensive weapon which a navy of the lesser order cannot do without. 4. It would be impossible to reduce or abolish defensive weapons without the risk of giving a dangerous advantage to "offensive needs." 5. France expects from the submarine the only protection against a long distance blockade by surface fleets. 6. The French Government is of the opinion that unrestricted submarine warfare against seafaring trade should be outlawed. The right to visit, search, seizure, should be exercised by submarines under the rules which have to be observed by surface warships. 7. Whilst France cannot accept abolition of the submarine , she is ready to concur in an international agreement regulating its use. |
Italy | 1. The Italian Government believe that in the present state of armaments the abolition of submarines would favour the stronger navies over the disadvantaged of the less powerful. On the other hand, the Italian Delegation would fail in its duty of cooperating in the solution of the general problem of disarmament; if it disregarded the general problems of disarmament brought forward by the advocates of total disarmaments. 2. The submarine is the only weapon which can be used with some chance of success against the battleships which the less powerful navies do not possess. 3. The Italian Government are prepared to renew an agreement restricting the use of submarines against merchant ships. 4. They keep an open mind on the question of abolition and a discussion on the subject would be in the interests of disarmament. 5. They do not object to the principle of abolition if all the naval powers concur, and if abolition is to exert a decisive influence towards drastic reduction of armaments. |
Japan | 1. A submarine has its proper legitimate uses. 2. It is an appropriate medium of defence as a scout and an instrument to ward off an offensive attack. 3. Japan sees in the submarine a convenient and adequate means of national defence and desires to retain submarines solely for that purpose. 4. Japan will give her full support to an undertaking to outlaw the illegitimate use of a legitimate agency of war. 5. Aeroplanes and airships have a wider of action than submarines and could play havoc not only at sea, but on land. |
Country | Built | Building | Projected | Total and Note (see below) |
British Empire | 53 | 10 | 3 | 66(a) |
United States | 122 | 5 | - | 127(b) |
Japan | 64 | 7 | - | 71(c) |
France | 52 | 47 | - | 99(d) |
Italy | 53 | 14 | - | 67(e) |
Note A: Includes one cruiser submarine (X1of 2425 tons) with 4 x 5.2" guns. 48 overseas patrol craft of between 760 and 1700 tons (nine dating from 1918 which would then reach the age limit of 13 years by 1931; and 17 smaller coast defence craft (5 dating from 1918). | ||||
Note B: Includes 3 large vessels (1 a minelayer) each of about 2700 tons. armed with 2 x 6" guns; 3 of 1960 tons; 53 overseas patrol boats of between 750 and 1026 tons, and 65 small coast defence craft of which 45 date from 1918 or before. | ||||
Note C: Includes 4 vessels of 1970 tons; 13 of 1650 tons; and the remainder between 665 and 1400 tons. All date from 1919 or later. | ||||
Note D: Includes 1 cruiser submarine (the Sureouf) of 2880 tons; 54 overseas patrol boats of between 748 and 1384 tons; 38 smaller defence craft with 23 dating from 1918 or before. | ||||
Note E: Includes 31 overseas patrol boats of between 709 and 1369 tons and 26 smaller defence craft. 20 date from 1918 or before. | ||||
Note the low score for the British Empire which of course was spread around the Old Commonwealth countries leaving the UK with even less than recordecd. |